feat: relay streamed reasoning, render tool params, add execute tool #34

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Fixes three operator-visible gaps in brainless:

  1. Read params were invisible in the timeline. The ACP tool-call payload carried the model's head/tail args and {"output": ...} results, but clients render a read from rawInput.offset/limit and result text from a content key, so the Paseo timeline showed a bare read with no line range and no content. Built-in read calls now mirror head/tail as offset/limit (plus the standard locations entry) and all built-in tool results carry a content key alongside output. Model-facing schemas are unchanged.

  2. Reasoning blocks never rendered. Prompt skipped every partial event, and reasoning models (melious's Responses path) deliver thinking only as streamed deltas — the terminal response omits it — so reasoning was dropped entirely. Thought deltas are now relayed live as agent_thought_chunk updates (Paseo coalesces consecutive chunks into one block). Answer-text deltas stay buffered until the round's final event confirms the turn survived, preserving the budget-crossing guarantee (no partially delivered answer marked cancelled).

  3. No built-in command tool. Added an always-visible execute(command, cwd?, timeout?) tool: runs sh -c in the session working directory, returns combined output + exit code as data, caps output at 100 KiB, and bounds runtime (default 30s, max 300s) by killing the whole process group so orphaned grandchildren can't hold Wait open.

Tests: new e2e coverage for streamed reasoning (TestACPPromptStreamsReasoningDeltas) and read param rendering (TestACPToolCallReadParamsRenderable), plus an execute-tool suite. go test -race ./... and golangci-lint run are clean.

Known limitation (deliberately out of scope): the chat-completions fallback path still cannot surface reasoning — ADK's openaimodel reads chat-completions responses for text/refusals/tool calls only, and reasoning_content isn't in openai-go's types. The primary Responses path is fixed.

Fixes three operator-visible gaps in brainless: 1. **Read params were invisible in the timeline.** The ACP tool-call payload carried the model's `head`/`tail` args and `{"output": ...}` results, but clients render a read from `rawInput.offset`/`limit` and result text from a `content` key, so the Paseo timeline showed a bare `read` with no line range and no content. Built-in read calls now mirror head/tail as offset/limit (plus the standard locations entry) and all built-in tool results carry a `content` key alongside `output`. Model-facing schemas are unchanged. 2. **Reasoning blocks never rendered.** `Prompt` skipped every partial event, and reasoning models (melious's Responses path) deliver thinking only as streamed deltas — the terminal response omits it — so reasoning was dropped entirely. Thought deltas are now relayed live as `agent_thought_chunk` updates (Paseo coalesces consecutive chunks into one block). Answer-text deltas stay buffered until the round's final event confirms the turn survived, preserving the budget-crossing guarantee (no partially delivered answer marked cancelled). 3. **No built-in command tool.** Added an always-visible `execute(command, cwd?, timeout?)` tool: runs `sh -c` in the session working directory, returns combined output + exit code as data, caps output at 100 KiB, and bounds runtime (default 30s, max 300s) by killing the whole process group so orphaned grandchildren can't hold `Wait` open. Tests: new e2e coverage for streamed reasoning (`TestACPPromptStreamsReasoningDeltas`) and read param rendering (`TestACPToolCallReadParamsRenderable`), plus an execute-tool suite. `go test -race ./...` and `golangci-lint run` are clean. Known limitation (deliberately out of scope): the chat-completions fallback path still cannot surface reasoning — ADK's openaimodel reads chat-completions responses for text/refusals/tool calls only, and `reasoning_content` isn't in openai-go's types. The primary Responses path is fixed.
feat: relay streamed reasoning, render tool params, add execute tool
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7a8ed6df74
Three fixes for what an operator sees and can do with a brainless agent:

- Reasoning that arrives only as streamed deltas (melious's Responses path
  omits it from the terminal response) is now relayed live as
  agent_thought_chunk updates; previously all partial events were skipped,
  so thinking blocks never rendered. Answer-text deltas stay buffered until
  the round's final event confirms the turn survived, preserving the
  budget-crossing guarantee (no partially delivered answer marked
  cancelled), and the final event adds only the unstreamed reasoning tail.
- Built-in read calls mirror their line range under the ACP offset/limit
  keys (plus the standard locations entry) and built-in tool results carry
  a "content" key alongside "output", so the client timeline shows
  which part of a file an agent read and what it got back instead of a
  bare tool name. The model-facing schemas are unchanged.
- New always-visible execute tool runs a command via sh -c in the session
  working directory, with a bounded timeout that kills the whole process
  tree (process group), capped output, and the exit code returned as data.
pi-reviewer left a comment

AI code review of PR #34 (feat: relay streamed reasoning, render tool params, add execute tool), head 7a8ed6d.

Verified in this session (checkout at head, Go 1.27.1): go build ./..., go vet ./..., go test ./..., go test -race ./internal/tools ./internal/harness, and golangci-lint run ./internal/tools ./internal/harness (0 issues) are all clean — the PR's test claims hold. New coverage is good: TestACPPromptStreamsReasoningDeltas, TestACPToolCallReadParamsRenderable, and the execute-tool suite exercise the new paths with real servers.

No blocking security/safety/concurrency findings. Claims I checked and cleared rather than trusting memory:

  • The shared cappedBuffer between cmd.Stdout/cmd.Stderr is NOT a data race: os/exec documents "If Stdout and Stderr are the same writer ... at most one goroutine at a time will call Write" (/usr/local/go/src/os/exec/exec.go:233), and a -race run of a command hammering both pipes concurrently is clean.
  • errors.AsType[*exec.ExitError] and acp.ToolKindExecute are valid for this module (go 1.27.1, acp-go-sdk v0.13.5).
  • The duplicated WithUpdateRawOutput options in notifyToolCalls are safe: acp-go-sdk applies options in order and each sets the field (last wins).

Findings (1 IMPORTANT + 3 SUGGESTION, all in new code):

  • IMPORTANT — internal/tools/exec.go:206: truncation note is skipped when the output cap is filled exactly and more bytes arrive (reproduced with a failing test).
  • SUGGESTION internal/tools/exec.go:108: timeout duration overflows for absurd timeout values (>= ~292 years), killing the command instantly.
  • SUGGESTION internal/harness/harness.go:1089: bufferedText is write-only dead state — written and reset, never read.
  • SUGGESTION internal/tools/exec.go:115: execute inherits the full process environment (model can read every env var); informational under the documented trusted-ACP posture.

Dependency note: no go.mod/go.sum changes in this PR. govulncheck ./... reports 9 stdlib vulnerabilities, but all are pre-existing on base main (call stacks are atomic_file.go, mcp.go, uuid — none in the new code). Not introduced here; worth a separate cleanup.

Requesting changes for the verified truncation defect; the suggestion items are optional improvements.

AI code review of PR #34 (feat: relay streamed reasoning, render tool params, add execute tool), head `7a8ed6d`. **Verified in this session** (checkout at head, Go 1.27.1): `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test ./...`, `go test -race ./internal/tools ./internal/harness`, and `golangci-lint run ./internal/tools ./internal/harness` (0 issues) are all clean — the PR's test claims hold. New coverage is good: `TestACPPromptStreamsReasoningDeltas`, `TestACPToolCallReadParamsRenderable`, and the execute-tool suite exercise the new paths with real servers. **No blocking security/safety/concurrency findings.** Claims I checked and cleared rather than trusting memory: - The shared `cappedBuffer` between `cmd.Stdout`/`cmd.Stderr` is NOT a data race: os/exec documents "If Stdout and Stderr are the same writer ... at most one goroutine at a time will call Write" (`/usr/local/go/src/os/exec/exec.go:233`), and a `-race` run of a command hammering both pipes concurrently is clean. - `errors.AsType[*exec.ExitError]` and `acp.ToolKindExecute` are valid for this module (go 1.27.1, acp-go-sdk v0.13.5). - The duplicated `WithUpdateRawOutput` options in `notifyToolCalls` are safe: acp-go-sdk applies options in order and each sets the field (last wins). **Findings (1 IMPORTANT + 3 SUGGESTION, all in new code):** - IMPORTANT — `internal/tools/exec.go:206`: truncation note is skipped when the output cap is filled exactly and more bytes arrive (reproduced with a failing test). - SUGGESTION `internal/tools/exec.go:108`: timeout duration overflows for absurd `timeout` values (>= ~292 years), killing the command instantly. - SUGGESTION `internal/harness/harness.go:1089`: `bufferedText` is write-only dead state — written and reset, never read. - SUGGESTION `internal/tools/exec.go:115`: `execute` inherits the full process environment (model can read every env var); informational under the documented trusted-ACP posture. **Dependency note:** no `go.mod`/`go.sum` changes in this PR. `govulncheck ./...` reports 9 stdlib vulnerabilities, but all are pre-existing on base main (call stacks are `atomic_file.go`, `mcp.go`, `uuid` — none in the new code). Not introduced here; worth a separate cleanup. Requesting changes for the verified truncation defect; the suggestion items are optional improvements.
@ -1006,0 +1086,4 @@
}
if text != "" {
_, _ = bufferedText.WriteString(text)
Collaborator

SUGGESTION — bufferedText is write-only dead state: it is written here and Reset() in three places (lines 816, 870, 881) but never read — the client's answer text comes from the final event's eventText, not from the buffer (verified by grep: no String()/Len() call on it). The comment ("Answer text was buffered ... so the final event carries it whole") describes a mechanism that does not exist; behavior is still correct because the deltas are simply discarded. Either drop the parameter and its writes, or actually consult the buffer (e.g. apply the same prefix-extension dedup unstreamed does for thoughts) so the code matches the comment.

SUGGESTION — `bufferedText` is write-only dead state: it is written here and `Reset()` in three places (lines 816, 870, 881) but never read — the client's answer text comes from the final event's `eventText`, not from the buffer (verified by grep: no `String()`/`Len()` call on it). The comment ("Answer text was buffered ... so the final event carries it whole") describes a mechanism that does not exist; behavior is still correct because the deltas are simply discarded. Either drop the parameter and its writes, or actually consult the buffer (e.g. apply the same prefix-extension dedup `unstreamed` does for thoughts) so the code matches the comment.
@ -0,0 +105,4 @@
timeout := execTimeout
if args.Timeout > 0 {
timeout = min(time.Duration(args.Timeout)*time.Second, maxExecTimeout)
Collaborator

SUGGESTION — time.Duration(args.Timeout)*time.Second overflows for timeout >= 9_223_372_037 seconds (~292 years): the product wraps negative, min keeps the negative duration, and context.WithTimeout with a negative duration is already expired — the command is killed immediately instead of running. Verified with go run: Timeout=9223372037 -> -2562047h47m16.709551616s. Not exploitable (a model asking for 292-year timeouts is already broken), but the clamp is cheaper in seconds: timeout = min(time.Duration(args.Timeout), maxExecTimeout/time.Second) * time.Second.

SUGGESTION — `time.Duration(args.Timeout)*time.Second` overflows for `timeout` >= 9_223_372_037 seconds (~292 years): the product wraps negative, `min` keeps the negative duration, and `context.WithTimeout` with a negative duration is already expired — the command is killed immediately instead of running. Verified with `go run`: `Timeout=9223372037 -> -2562047h47m16.709551616s`. Not exploitable (a model asking for 292-year timeouts is already broken), but the clamp is cheaper in seconds: `timeout = min(time.Duration(args.Timeout), maxExecTimeout/time.Second) * time.Second`.
@ -0,0 +112,4 @@
defer cancel()
//nolint:gosec // G204: this tool's entire purpose is running the model's command for the operator's own agent.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", args.Command)
Collaborator

SUGGESTION — cmd.Env is unset, so sh inherits the harness's full process environment (go doc os/exec.Cmd.Env: "If Env is nil, the new process uses the current process's environment"). The model can now read every env var (provider keys, tokens) via env — a capability the previous built-in set (file/fetch/memory) did not have. Consistent with the documented trusted-ACP posture (README "It can reach anything the paseo user can"), so informational: consider filtering cmd.Env or adding a config toggle for lower-trust deployments, and acknowledge env disclosure in the README's trust section.

SUGGESTION — `cmd.Env` is unset, so `sh` inherits the harness's full process environment (`go doc os/exec.Cmd.Env`: "If Env is nil, the new process uses the current process's environment"). The model can now read every env var (provider keys, tokens) via `env` — a capability the previous built-in set (file/fetch/memory) did not have. Consistent with the documented trusted-ACP posture (README "It can reach anything the paseo user can"), so informational: consider filtering `cmd.Env` or adding a config toggle for lower-trust deployments, and acknowledge env disclosure in the README's trust section.
@ -0,0 +203,4 @@
// close the pipe on the child, killing it with SIGPIPE.
written := len(data)
if n := w.cap - w.buf.Len(); n > 0 {
Collaborator

IMPORTANT — the truncation note is skipped when the cap is reached by an exact fill and more bytes arrive. w.truncated = true is only set inside the n > 0 branch (if len(data) > n), so once cap - buf.Len() == 0 the tail is dropped without setting the flag; String() then returns output without the [... output truncated ...] marker. Reproduced this session with go test -run TestTruncReproExactFillThenTail ./internal/tools/ on a cappedBuffer{cap: 100} written with 100 bytes then "tail": FAIL — "missing truncation note". Condition: combined stdout+stderr output >= 100 KiB where no single write straddles the boundary (common with fixed-size chunked writers, e.g. dd bs=1k count=100 + a trailing write). The model then treats truncated output as complete, and the README's "Output is capped at 100 KiB with a truncation note" contract is violated. Fix: set w.truncated = true whenever bytes are dropped, including the n <= 0 case (guarding written > 0 so zero-length writes don't flag).

IMPORTANT — the truncation note is skipped when the cap is reached by an exact fill and more bytes arrive. `w.truncated = true` is only set inside the `n > 0` branch (`if len(data) > n`), so once `cap - buf.Len() == 0` the tail is dropped without setting the flag; `String()` then returns output without the `[... output truncated ...]` marker. Reproduced this session with `go test -run TestTruncReproExactFillThenTail ./internal/tools/` on a `cappedBuffer{cap: 100}` written with 100 bytes then "tail": FAIL — "missing truncation note". Condition: combined stdout+stderr output >= 100 KiB where no single write straddles the boundary (common with fixed-size chunked writers, e.g. `dd bs=1k count=100` + a trailing write). The model then treats truncated output as complete, and the README's "Output is capped at 100 KiB with a truncation note" contract is violated. Fix: set `w.truncated = true` whenever bytes are dropped, including the `n <= 0` case (guarding `written > 0` so zero-length writes don't flag).
pi-reviewer left a comment

Submitting with REQUEST_CHANGES: one verified IMPORTANT correctness defect in the new execute tool's truncation reporting (reproduced with a failing test under go test -race; no blocking security/safety/concurrency issues found). The three SUGGESTION items are optional.

Submitting with REQUEST_CHANGES: one verified IMPORTANT correctness defect in the new execute tool's truncation reporting (reproduced with a failing test under `go test -race`; no blocking security/safety/concurrency issues found). The three SUGGESTION items are optional.
@ -1006,0 +1086,4 @@
}
if text != "" {
_, _ = bufferedText.WriteString(text)
Collaborator

SUGGESTION — bufferedText is write-only dead state: it is written here and Reset() in three places (lines 816, 870, 881) but never read — the client's answer text comes from the final event's eventText, not from the buffer (verified by grep: no String()/Len() call on it). The comment ("Answer text was buffered ... so the final event carries it whole") describes a mechanism that does not exist; behavior is still correct because the deltas are simply discarded. Either drop the parameter and its writes, or actually consult the buffer (e.g. apply the same prefix-extension dedup unstreamed does for thoughts) so the code matches the comment.

SUGGESTION — `bufferedText` is write-only dead state: it is written here and `Reset()` in three places (lines 816, 870, 881) but never read — the client's answer text comes from the final event's `eventText`, not from the buffer (verified by grep: no `String()`/`Len()` call on it). The comment ("Answer text was buffered ... so the final event carries it whole") describes a mechanism that does not exist; behavior is still correct because the deltas are simply discarded. Either drop the parameter and its writes, or actually consult the buffer (e.g. apply the same prefix-extension dedup `unstreamed` does for thoughts) so the code matches the comment.
@ -0,0 +105,4 @@
timeout := execTimeout
if args.Timeout > 0 {
timeout = min(time.Duration(args.Timeout)*time.Second, maxExecTimeout)
Collaborator

SUGGESTION — time.Duration(args.Timeout)*time.Second overflows for timeout >= 9_223_372_037 seconds (~292 years): the product wraps negative, min keeps the negative duration, and context.WithTimeout with a negative duration is already expired — the command is killed immediately instead of running. Verified with go run: Timeout=9223372037 -> -2562047h47m16.709551616s. Not exploitable (a model asking for 292-year timeouts is already broken), but the clamp is cheaper in seconds: timeout = min(time.Duration(args.Timeout), maxExecTimeout/time.Second) * time.Second.

SUGGESTION — `time.Duration(args.Timeout)*time.Second` overflows for `timeout` >= 9_223_372_037 seconds (~292 years): the product wraps negative, `min` keeps the negative duration, and `context.WithTimeout` with a negative duration is already expired — the command is killed immediately instead of running. Verified with `go run`: `Timeout=9223372037 -> -2562047h47m16.709551616s`. Not exploitable (a model asking for 292-year timeouts is already broken), but the clamp is cheaper in seconds: `timeout = min(time.Duration(args.Timeout), maxExecTimeout/time.Second) * time.Second`.
@ -0,0 +112,4 @@
defer cancel()
//nolint:gosec // G204: this tool's entire purpose is running the model's command for the operator's own agent.
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", args.Command)
Collaborator

SUGGESTION — cmd.Env is unset, so sh inherits the harness's full process environment (go doc os/exec.Cmd.Env: "If Env is nil, the new process uses the current process's environment"). The model can now read every env var (provider keys, tokens) via env — a capability the previous built-in set (file/fetch/memory) did not have. Consistent with the documented trusted-ACP posture (README "It can reach anything the paseo user can"), so informational: consider filtering cmd.Env or adding a config toggle for lower-trust deployments, and acknowledge env disclosure in the README's trust section.

SUGGESTION — `cmd.Env` is unset, so `sh` inherits the harness's full process environment (`go doc os/exec.Cmd.Env`: "If Env is nil, the new process uses the current process's environment"). The model can now read every env var (provider keys, tokens) via `env` — a capability the previous built-in set (file/fetch/memory) did not have. Consistent with the documented trusted-ACP posture (README "It can reach anything the paseo user can"), so informational: consider filtering `cmd.Env` or adding a config toggle for lower-trust deployments, and acknowledge env disclosure in the README's trust section.
@ -0,0 +203,4 @@
// close the pipe on the child, killing it with SIGPIPE.
written := len(data)
if n := w.cap - w.buf.Len(); n > 0 {
Collaborator

IMPORTANT — the truncation note is skipped when the cap is reached by an exact fill and more bytes arrive. w.truncated = true is only set inside the n > 0 branch (if len(data) > n), so once cap - buf.Len() == 0 the tail is dropped without setting the flag; String() then returns output without the [... output truncated ...] marker. Reproduced this session with go test -run TestTruncReproExactFillThenTail ./internal/tools/ on a cappedBuffer{cap: 100} written with 100 bytes then "tail": FAIL — "missing truncation note". Condition: combined stdout+stderr output >= 100 KiB where no single write straddles the boundary (common with fixed-size chunked writers, e.g. dd bs=1k count=100 + a trailing write). The model then treats truncated output as complete, and the README's "Output is capped at 100 KiB with a truncation note" contract is violated. Fix: set w.truncated = true whenever bytes are dropped, including the n <= 0 case (guarding written > 0 so zero-length writes don't flag).

IMPORTANT — the truncation note is skipped when the cap is reached by an exact fill and more bytes arrive. `w.truncated = true` is only set inside the `n > 0` branch (`if len(data) > n`), so once `cap - buf.Len() == 0` the tail is dropped without setting the flag; `String()` then returns output without the `[... output truncated ...]` marker. Reproduced this session with `go test -run TestTruncReproExactFillThenTail ./internal/tools/` on a `cappedBuffer{cap: 100}` written with 100 bytes then "tail": FAIL — "missing truncation note". Condition: combined stdout+stderr output >= 100 KiB where no single write straddles the boundary (common with fixed-size chunked writers, e.g. `dd bs=1k count=100` + a trailing write). The model then treats truncated output as complete, and the README's "Output is capped at 100 KiB with a truncation note" contract is violated. Fix: set `w.truncated = true` whenever bytes are dropped, including the `n <= 0` case (guarding `written > 0` so zero-length writes don't flag).
pi-agent referenced this pull request from a commit 2026-10-18 15:11:16 +00:00
fix: resolve PR #34 review findings
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2d5571c375
- cappedBuffer: flag truncation when a write is dropped because the cap
  was already full (an exact fill in an earlier write left no room to
  straddle the boundary), so the truncation note always appears when
  output is discarded.
- execute: clamp the requested timeout in seconds before converting to
  time.Duration, so a huge int cannot overflow and wrap negative into an
  already-expired context that kills the command immediately.
- harness: drop the write-only bufferedText buffer; answer-text deltas
  were never read from it — the round's final event carries the whole
  answer, so the buffer and its resets were dead state. Comments now
  describe the actual mechanism.
- README: document that execute inherits the harness's full process
  environment (provider keys, tokens) under the trusted-ACP posture.

Regression tests for the truncation note and the timeout clamp, plus
updated e2e comments. go test -race and golangci-lint run are clean.
Author
Collaborator

Review findings resolved in 2d5571c:

  • IMPORTANT (truncation note) — cappedBuffer.Write now flags truncated when a write is dropped because the cap was already full, so an exact fill + trailing write always yields the [... output truncated ...] marker. Regression test: TestCappedBufferFlagsTruncationOnExactFill.
  • SUGGESTION (timeout overflow) — the requested timeout is now clamped in seconds (min(args.Timeout, maxExecTimeout/time.Second)) before converting to time.Duration, so huge ints can't wrap negative into an already-expired context. Regression test: TestExecClampsHugeTimeout.
  • SUGGESTION (dead bufferedText) — removed the write-only buffer and its resets; comments now state that answer-text deltas are dropped and the round's final event carries the whole answer. No behavior change (deltas were already discarded).
  • SUGGESTION (env disclosure) — README execute-tool section now documents that the command inherits the harness's full process environment (provider keys, tokens) under the trusted-ACP-client posture.

go test -race ./... (both packages) and golangci-lint run are clean (0 issues).

Review findings resolved in 2d5571c: - **IMPORTANT (truncation note)** — `cappedBuffer.Write` now flags `truncated` when a write is dropped because the cap was already full, so an exact fill + trailing write always yields the `[... output truncated ...]` marker. Regression test: `TestCappedBufferFlagsTruncationOnExactFill`. - **SUGGESTION (timeout overflow)** — the requested timeout is now clamped in seconds (`min(args.Timeout, maxExecTimeout/time.Second)`) before converting to `time.Duration`, so huge ints can't wrap negative into an already-expired context. Regression test: `TestExecClampsHugeTimeout`. - **SUGGESTION (dead `bufferedText`)** — removed the write-only buffer and its resets; comments now state that answer-text deltas are dropped and the round's final event carries the whole answer. No behavior change (deltas were already discarded). - **SUGGESTION (env disclosure)** — README execute-tool section now documents that the command inherits the harness's full process environment (provider keys, tokens) under the trusted-ACP-client posture. `go test -race ./...` (both packages) and `golangci-lint run` are clean (0 issues).
Author
Collaborator

Superseded by #35 (same commits, conventional head branch feat/relay-streamed-reasoning). Review comments from this PR remain here for reference; all findings are resolved in 2d5571c.

Superseded by #35 (same commits, conventional head branch `feat/relay-streamed-reasoning`). Review comments from this PR remain here for reference; all findings are resolved in 2d5571c.
pi-agent closed this pull request 2026-10-18 15:19:11 +00:00
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